New Attorney-Client Fee Agreements in Illinois

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 300: New Procedures, Same Standard in Petitioning for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.

By Michael Rothmann

Effective July 1, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 300[i], governing attorney fee petitions. The rule allows greater flexibility in fee arrangements and clarifies what courts must review when evaluating attorney compensation. It establishes procedures for filing fee petitions in actions where fees are authorized by statute, rule, contract, or court order, and recognizes a variety of permissible fee structures beyond traditional hourly billing.

Under Rule 300, attorneys may base fee petitions on arrangements such as flat fees, subscription-style retainers, limited-scope engagements, or other agreements permitted under Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.[ii], [iii] Contingent-fee agreements, however, may not be used to recover fees from an opposing party.[iv]

A petition must include a summary of the services provided and a summary of the fee agreement, along with relevant excerpts of any written agreement sufficient for the court to determine the reasonable value of the services.[v] Time-based entries are required only when (1) the fee agreement includes an hourly rate; (2) the attorney seeks to recover more than the client agreed to pay and the award is not otherwise fixed; or (3) the attorney has a contingent-fee agreement and seeks recovery from an opposing party under a fee-shifting provision.[vi] The rule also permits attorneys who provide pro bono services to petition for and recover fees where authorized.[vii]

Prior to Rule 300, courts often expected fee petitions to be supported by hourly billing records, even when attorneys and clients had agreed to alternative fee arrangements. Rule 300 reflects a broader understanding of legal services and reduces disputes over timekeeping where hourly billing is not the basis of the representation.

Importantly, Rule 300 does not change the substantive standards courts use to determine reasonable attorney fees. Illinois courts continue to evaluate reasonableness by considering factors such as the skill and standing of counsel, the nature and difficulty of the case, the importance of the matter, the responsibility involved, the customary charges for similar services, the benefit to the client, and the relationship between the requested fees and the amount involved in the litigation.[viii] Courts frequently apply the lodestar method, calculating reasonable fees based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.[ix]

One of the first decisions addressing the interaction between Rule 300 and fee-shifting statutes was issued by Judge Thaddeus Wilson in Samantha Webb v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefits Fund of Chicago.[x]

In that case, Rothmann Law filed a petition for attorney fees after successfully overturning the Board’s denial of duty disability benefits for a Chicago police officer injured in the line of duty. Section 5-228(b) of the Illinois Pension Code provides that when an officer prevails in an appeal from the denial of duty disability benefits, the officer may recover court costs, litigation expenses, and reasonable attorney fees from the Fund.[xi] The statute functions as a fee-shifting provision similar to 42 U.S.C. §1988.[xii]

The attorney-client agreement was attached to the petition, with the reduced contractual fee amount redacted. The petition sought recovery at the prevailing market rate.[xiii], [xiv]

The Board argued that because Rule 300 requires the fee agreement to be attached to the petition, the recoverable fee should be limited to the lower amount agreed upon between the attorney and the client. This argument raised practical concerns. Chicago police officers are not eligible for workers’ compensation benefits and often have no income while duty disability claims are pending. As a result, attorneys may reduce their rates to make representation possible. If recoverable fees were limited to those reduced contractual amounts, attorneys would face significant disincentives to pursue these appeals, potentially leaving administrative decisions effectively insulated from review.[xv]

The court rejected the Board’s argument, concluding that Rule 300 is procedural rather than substantive. While the rule governs the documentation required for fee petitions, it does not alter the standards used to determine a reasonable attorney fee under fee-shifting statutes. The court therefore evaluated the request using the prevailing market-rate framework.

The court also illustrated the weakness of the Board’s position by posing a hypothetical: if the attorney’s contractual rate exceeded the prevailing market rate, the Fund would likely argue that the recoverable fee should be limited to the market rate rather than the contractual amount. The same reasoning applied in reverse.

Arguments that a prevailing party receives a “windfall” when fees are awarded at the prevailing market rate despite reduced or pro bono representation have also been rejected by Illinois courts. Neither Rule 300 nor section 5-228(b) limits recovery to fees actually incurred. In Kirk, the appellate court reversed a trial court’s denial of fees in a civil rights case where counsel represented the plaintiff pro bono, holding that the trial court improperly added a requirement not contained in the statute.[xvi] By contrast, when a statute expressly limits recovery to fees “incurred,” courts will enforce that limitation.[xvii]

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

Rule 300 expands the range of fee arrangements that may support a fee petition but does not alter the principles courts apply when determining reasonable attorney fees. Practitioners should ensure that fee petitions include a clear description of the services performed and the relevant fee agreement, as required by the rule. Where fee-shifting statutes apply, attorneys may still seek fees based on prevailing market rates, even when the underlying attorney-client agreement reflects a reduced rate, alternative fee structure, or pro bono representation.

As courts begin applying Rule 300, additional guidance will likely follow. The early decisions, however, suggest a clear principle: Rule 300 governs the mechanics of presenting a fee petition, not the substantive determination of reasonable attorney fees. Rule 300 changes the paperwork surrounding fee petitions, but not the principles that determine what a reasonable attorney fee actually is.

               

 

[i] Il. S. Ct. Rule 300 (July 1, 2025);

[ii] Id. Rule 300(b);

[iii] Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2023) R. 1.5 (eff. July 1, 2023);

[iv] Ill. S. Ct. Rule 300(b);

[v] Id. Rule 300(a);

[vi] Id. Rule 300(c);

[vii] Id. Rule 300(d);

[viii] Young v. Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887;

[ix] Robinson v. Point One Toyota, Evanston, 2017 IL App (1st) 152114;

[x] Samantha Webb v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefits Fund of Chicago, No. 24 CH 9843 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Feb. 2, 2026);

[xi] 40 ILCS 5/5-228(b)(West 2019);

[xii] 42 U.S.C. §1988 (2026);

[xiii] Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo. Assn’, 2013 IL 110505;

[xiv] Kroot v. Shu B. Chan, 2019 IL App (1st) 181392;

[xv] Kirk v. Arnold, 2020 IL App (1st) 190782-U, ¶¶ 24-26;

[xvi] Kirk. ¶¶ 19–22, citing Kroot, 2019 IL App (1st) 181392, ¶ 11, and Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 5;.

[xvii] Kroot, 2019 IL App (1st) 181392, ¶¶ 11–13.